From Population to Vital System: National Security and the Changing Object of Public Health by Lakoff, Andrew
ANDREW LAKOFF
no.7
ANTHROPOLOGY
of the CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH
COLLABORATORY
ARC
FROM POPULATION TO
VITAL SYSTEM
2007
working paper
ARC
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH COLLABORATORY (ARC) AIMS 
TO DEVELOP NEW TECHNIQUES OF COLLABORATION, MODES OF COMMUNICATION AND 
TOOLS OF INQUIRY FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES.  AT ARC’S CORE ARE 
COLLABORATIONS ON SHARED PROBLEMS AND CONCEPTS, INITIALLY FOCUSING ON 
SECURITY, BIOPOLITICS, AND THE LIFE SCIENCES, AND THE NEW FORMS OF INQUIRY.
WWW.ANTHROPOS-LAB.NET
Suggested Citation: Lakoff, Andrew. “From Population to Vital System:
National Security and the Changing Object of Public Health,” ARC Working Paper,
No. 7, 2007.
Copyright: © 2007 ARC  
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0
 
 
ARC Working Paper No. 7 
From Population to Vital System:  
National Security and the Changing Object of Public Health 
 
Andrew Lakoff 
 
 
In early 1976, US health officials warned the Ford administration that a new 
strain of influenza had appeared in the United States, and threatened to 
become a deadly pandemic. A soldier had died in Fort Dix, and others at the 
base were infected with the virus. Experts and officials gathered and quickly 
recommended a plan of action to the President: an urgent, intensive program to 
immunize the entire US population before the next flu season, at an estimated 
cost of $135 million. Such a program had never been tried before – indeed, it 
had only recently become technically feasible. But given the perceived scale of 
the swine flu threat and the new possibility of intervention, public health experts 
were nearly unanimous about the rational course of action: mass vaccination. 
“If we believe in preventive medicine,” as one infectious disease expert said, 
“we have no choice.”1 
 
Three decades later, in the fall of 2005, the attention of the US government was 
again focused on the threat of pandemic influenza. This time the threat did not 
come suddenly – public health officials had been warning of its danger with 
increasing urgency since the appearance of a deadly strain of the virus in Hong 
Kong in 1997. But it seemed that now a major initiative was possible, in part 
because of an increasing perception of the seriousness of the threat, as the 
virus spread globally through poultry stocks and migratory birds; in part as a 
result of fallout from the administration’s widely perceived failure to respond to 
Hurricane Katrina. President Bush described the combination of urgency and 
uncertainty posed by avian flu: “Scientists and doctors cannot tell us where or 
when the next pandemic will strike, or how severe it will be, but most agree: at 
some point, we are likely to face another pandemic.”2 Or, as a concerned 
senator put it: “Experts no longer ask if such a pandemic could occur, rather 
they question when it will occur.”3  
 
In November, the administration unveiled a $7.1 billion pandemic preparedness 
strategy described by the Secretary of Health as “the most robust proposal 
                                                
A number of the ideas in this paper were developed in conversation with Stephen Collier. It has also 
benefited from ongoing exchanges with Carlo Caduff, Lyle Fearnley, Dale Rose and Paul Rabinow.  
1 Neustadt and Fineberg, The Epidemic That Never Was. 
2 White House Press Release, November 1, 2005: “President Outlines Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response.” 
3 Senator Kohl, in Senate Special Committee on Aging, Hearing on Pandemic Flu Preparedness, May 
25, 2006. 
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ever made for public health at one time.”4 The plan included funds for disease 
surveillance, stockpiling anti-viral medicine, and new methods of vaccine 
production. The details of the administration’s plan were sharply criticized in the 
public health world as overly focused on pharmaceutical interventions, and as 
under-emphasizing the needs of state and local health agencies. But among 
various commentators, there was remarkable accord on several points. First, 
that pandemic planning was an matter of urgent concern; second, that the 
nation was currently far from adequately prepared for it; and third, that whether 
or not a pandemic occurred, the process of preparing for it would strengthen 
readiness for other potential threats. As the senator put it, “even if we are 
spared from a flu pandemic, the work that we do today will serve us all well in 
the event of any national emergency.”5 
 
Indeed, the flu threat had become a vehicle for a more general form of planning 
– one oriented toward a variety of potential threats. The Assistant Secretary of 
Health said, “preparedness for a pandemic makes us a nation better prepared 
for any and all hazards, manmade or natural.”6 But, he warned, such a 
condition would not come quickly or easily: “preparedness is a journey, not a 
destination. It’s a journey that must be nationwide, involve federal, state and 
local leaders in partnership, and include every sector of society.”7 As the 
Secretary put it, “We’re overdue and we’re not as well prepared as we need to 
be. We’re better prepared than we were yesterday. We’ll be better prepared 
tomorrow than we are today. It’s a continuum of preparedness.”8 The states’ 
organization of health officers agreed: “Are we fully prepared? Absolutely not. 
We are more prepared than we were several years ago but not prepared 
enough.”9  
 
Over the course of three decades, a new way of thinking about and acting on 
disease threat had emerged: it was no longer a question only of prevention, but 
also – and perhaps even more – one of preparedness. How did this shift 
happen? How did we become unprepared? By this question I do not mean that 
we were once prepared and are now less so, but rather, I mean to ask how a 
norm of preparedness came to structure thought about threats to public health. 
The story is a complex one, involving the migration of techniques initially 
                                                
4 Mike Leavitt, “Remarks to the Convening of the States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness,” 
December 5, 2005.  
5 Senator Kohl, in Senate Special Committee on Aging, Hearing on Pandemic Flu Preparedness, May 
25, 2006. 
6 John Agwunobi, Testimony to House Government Reform Committee, Hearing on Pandemic Flu 
Planning, May 11, 2006. 
7 John O. Agwunabi, testimony to House Government Reform Committee, Hearing on Government 
Pandemic Flu Planning, May 11, 2006. 
8 Leavitt testimony, to Senate Special Committee on Aging, Hearing on Pandemic Flu Preparedness, 
May 25, 2006. 
9 Selecky, testimony to Joint Hearing on Avian Flu, House Homeland Security Committee, February 8, 
2006. 
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developed in the military and civil defense to other areas of governmental 
intervention. In this paper, I focus on one particular technique, the scenario-
based exercise. I suggest that this technique served two important functions: 
first, to generate an affect of urgency in the absence of the event itself; and 
second, to generate knowledge about vulnerabilities in response capability that 
could then guide intervention. The scenario-based exercise, I will suggest, is 
exemplary of the rationality underlying the contemporary articulation of national 
security and public health. 
 
 
National Security and Public Health 
 
In his March 2006 Congressional testimony on avian flu preparedness, former 
White House Homeland Security Advisor Richard Falkenrath said: “When 
viewed in comparison to all other conceivable threats to US national security, 
the catastrophic disease threat is and for the foreseeable future will remain the 
greatest danger we face.”10 Given Falkenrath’s background as an expert in 
counter-terrorism and nuclear proliferation, this was a striking statement – a 
clear affirmation that national security strategists must turn their attention to a 
subject that, until recently, had been in the domain of public health. 
 
As Nicholas King and others have shown, this was by no means the first 
conjuncture of national security concerns with public health.11 To understand 
the implications of Falkenrath’s claim – and its distinction from prior such 
conjunctures – it is useful to analytically disaggregate the concept of “national 
security.” In other words, to ask: what type of security is meant? What are its 
political objectives and what are its technical methods? This set of questions 
comes out of a project on contemporary security expertise that I have been 
engaged in with Stephen Collier. As part of this project, we have sought to 
develop an analytic grid that distinguishes among different forms of collective 
security. In developing this grid, we began with a contrast between two familiar 
forms of collective security, each of which defines a distinctive political 
obligation and normative rationality (See Table 1).12 “Sovereign state security” 
dates from the 17th century, and refers to practices oriented to the defense of 
territorial sovereignty against foreign enemies using military means. “Population 
security,” which emerged in the 19th century, involves the protection of the 
national population against regularly occurring internal threats, such as illness, 
industrial accident, or infirmity. Its exemplary knowledge forms include 
epidemiology and demography, and its interventions (typically associated with  
                                                
10 Falkenrath, Testimony to Senate Committee Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
March 16, 2006. 
11 Nicholas B. King, “Security, Disease, Commerce: Post-colonial Ideologies of Global Health,” in 
Social Studies of Science 32 (2002). See also Fearnley (2005). 
12 Collier and Lakoff, Vital Systems Security. ARC Working Paper Series (2006). See www.anthropos-
lab.net  
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Table 1 
Forms of Collective Security 
 
 
 
Sovereign State 
Security 
Population Security Vital Systems 
Security 
Moment of 
articulation 
 
17th century 
territorial 
monarchies 
19th century urban 
hygiene 
Mid-20th century 
civil defense 
Normative 
rationality 
 
Interdiction Welfare Preparedness 
Types of threat 
 
 
Adversaries Regularly occurring 
events  
Unpredictable, 
potentially 
catastrophic events 
Exemplary form of 
knowledge 
 
Strategy Epidemiology, 
demography 
Imaginative 
enactment 
Operation 
 
 
Deter or defend 
against enemy 
Distribute risk Gauge vulnerability, 
develop capability 
 
social welfare) range from social insurance and public health to urban 
infrastructure development.  
 
However, we found that a number of current security initiatives – such as avian 
flu preparedness – did not fit neatly into either one of these security 
frameworks. We have suggested that a third form of collective security, “vital 
systems security,” has become increasingly central in recent years. This form of 
security is oriented to a distinctive type of threat: the event whose probability 
cannot be calculated, but whose consequences are potentially catastrophic. Its 
object of protection is not the national territory or the population but rather the 
critical systems that underpin social and economic life. Vital systems security 
does not develop knowledge about an enemy or about regularly occurring 
events, but rather uses techniques of imaginative enactment to generate 
knowledge about system-vulnerabilities. Its interventions are not focused on 
modulating the living conditions of human beings, but rather on assuring the 
continuous functioning of these systems.  
 
Vital systems security did not emerge whole cloth, but rather came out of one 
practice of sovereign state security – civil defense – beginning in the 1960s. Its 
techniques were initially developed to approach the threat of nuclear attack, but 
were gradually extended to approach other potential catastrophes, ranging 
from natural disasters, to technological accidents, terrorist attacks and 
epidemics of infectious disease.13  
                                                
13 For the extension of practices of civil defense to non-nuclear threats, see Andrew Lakoff, “Preparing 
for the Next Emergency,” Public Culture 19:2 (2007). 
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It should be underlined that these distinctions do not mark epochal shifts: we 
do not mean to suggest that there has been an overarching transformation from 
one form of security to another, but rather that these forms operate in dynamic 
relation to one another – so, for example, the very systems that were developed 
as the means of population security have now, in some cases, become the 
targets of vital systems security. In what follows, I will describe how this 
occurred in the case of public health. In tracing this story, I want to show that a 
vital systems approach emerges at the limit point of population security – but 
that it is constrained in the types of problems it can approach. 
 
 
Swine flu and the limits of calculability 
 
As part of population security, classical public health was based on the 
possibility of calculating the probability of disease incidence in a population. 
The case of nineteenth century Britain is instructive. As George Rosen has 
shown, British health social reformers carefully tracked the incidence of disease 
according to differential social locations to make the argument that “health was 
affected for better or worse by the state of the physical or social 
environment.”14 Such knowledge was cumulative and calculative. Reformers 
gathered and analyzed vital statistics – rates of birth, death, and illness among 
various classes – in order to demonstrate the economic rationality of disease 
prevention measures such as the provision of clean water or the removal of 
waste from streets. Thus, as Chadwick’s famous 1842 Inquiry into sanitary 
conditions among the working classes argued, “the expenditures necessary to 
the adoption and maintenance of measures of prevention would ultimately 
amount to less than the cost of disease now constantly expanded.”15 
 
If this initial mode of public health intervention emphasized social conditions – 
sanitation, nutrition, the safety of factories – a next iteration worked more 
directly on the bodies of the collectivity. The rise of bacteriology in the late 
nineteenth century led to the systematic practice of immunization against 
infectious disease. But again, making rational public health interventions 
required knowledge about the historical pattern of disease incidence in the 
population. For example, in designing New York City’s vaccination campaign 
against diphtheria among schoolchildren in the 1920s, it was “necessary to 
know the natural history of diphtheria within the community: How many children 
of different ages had already acquired immunity, how many were well carriers, 
                                                
14 Rosen, History of Public Health, 185. For the French case, see Francois Delaporte, Disease and 
Civilization, and Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment. 
15 Rosen, 187, citing the classic Report … on an inquiry into the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain. Ian Hacking looks to this period to find the moment when a “laws of 
sickness” were discovered, in part through the use of benefit societies’ actuarial tables. See The 
Taming of Chance.  
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and what children were highly susceptible?”16 Such data were gathered in order 
to make decisions based on the balance between the expected costs and 
benefits of a given intervention.  
 
The object of public health knowledge and intervention is the population – as 
Foucault put it, “a global mass affected by overall pressures of birth, death, 
production, illness.”17 These phenomena are not predictable at the level of the 
individual, but show regularities when tracked within a group of individuals over 
time. Interventions seek to know and manage these regularities, to decrease 
mortality and increase longevity: to “optimize a state of life.”18 For this reason 
public health expertise has difficulty in rationally approaching events that 
cannot be mapped through statistical means. What happens when it is faced 
with the threat of a singular event – one whose probability is not known, but 
whose consequences could be catastrophic?  
 
The Swine Flu Fiasco 
 
In January 1976, the Centers for Disease Control reported that a soldier at Fort 
Dix had died of an unfamiliar strain of swine flu. Moreover, there were several 
other cases of the same flu, and so the virus seemed to be both virulent and 
capable of human-to-human transmission. Was a pandemic on the horizon? At 
the time, some experts believed that antigenic shifts leading to deadly 
pandemics occurred approximately once per decade. The last one had 
occurred in 1968. In the worst case, this strain might be comparable to the 
1918 Spanish Flu, which, it was estimated, had killed over fifty million people 
worldwide.19 
 
The possibility of pandemic flu had not been part of the planning process for 
US health officials. For this reason, it was not immediately clear what options 
were available. A catastrophe on the scale of 1918 was not predictable, but 
was possible. Edwin Kilbourne, a leading influenza expert, warned health 
officials to plan without delay for an imminent natural disaster. Given the tools 
available, there seemed to be only one possible course of action: vaccination of 
the entire US population. Such an option would be both expensive and 
practically daunting. It would mean producing and distributing enough vaccine 
to immunize over two hundred million people by the next flu season. This was a 
new technical possibility: only recently could enough flu vaccine be produced in 
a given year to envision mass immunization. But a decision would have to be 
made immediately. And there was no way of knowing whether the cases at Fort 
Dix were signs of an imminent pandemic or a fluke.  
                                                
16 Rosen, 312. 
17 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 243. 
18 Society Must Be Defended, p. 
19 This account is based on Richard E. Neustadt and Harvey V. Fineberg, The Epidemic That Never 
Was: Policy Making and the Swine Flu Scare. New York: Vintage, 1983. 
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Health officials were thus faced – for the first time – with the possibility of 
intervening in advance of a potential flu pandemic. This situation presented a 
problem for public health expertise. As we have seen, modern public health 
institutions had been set up in response to actual – rather than potential – 
disease incidence. Indeed, they relied on archival knowledge of the timing and 
location of outbreaks to design effective interventions. For this reason, as the 
swine flu affair demonstrates, experts had difficulty in approaching a 
foreseeable, but not statistically calculable event. 
 
On March 10, CDC officials met with the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP). Each year the Committee recommended which viruses to 
vaccinate against, and which groups to target for vaccination. Since the general 
population did not have any immunity to this new strain, an immunization plan 
could not be limited to high-risk groups.20 At the meeting, the group observed: 
first, there was evidence of a new strain with human-to-human transmission; 
second, all previous new strains had been followed by pandemics; and third, 
for the first time there was both knowledge and time to provide for mass 
immunization, given developments in vaccine production techniques. Some 
experts also saw an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of preventive 
medicine, to “strike a blow for epidemiology in the interest in humanity.”21 If the 
plan were immediately put in motion, inoculation could begin by the summer. 
 
One question was raised, but not pursued: under what circumstances might it 
make sense to produce and then stockpile the vaccine rather than moving 
straight to mass vaccination? The CDC’s Director David Sencer argued that the 
virus would spread too quickly and that distribution logistics were too difficult 
to consider waiting for evidence of an epidemic before beginning vaccination. 
There was also a concern about future blame: if officials chose not to vaccinate 
and then there was a deadly pandemic, they would face biting criticism. It 
would be said that “they had opportunity to save life,” but didn’t take it.22 
 
Following the meeting, Sencer wrote a strongly worded memorandum to his 
superiors at the Department of Health summarizing the Committee’s advice. 
Given what he called a “strong possibility” of widespread swine influenza that 
could be highly virulent, the Committee recommended a plan to immunize 213 
million people in three months, at a cost of $134 million. The memo’s tone was 
urgent: “The situation is one of ‘go or no go’… there is barely enough time. … A 
                                                
20 As the CDC Director David Sencer later said: “Most people were at risk… An epidemic spreading 
into a pandemic had to be considered as a possibility.” From the vantage of preventive medicine, 
“something had to be done.” Ibid., 25. 
21 Ibid., 26. 
22 Ibid., 28. 
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decision must be made now.”23 The Secretary of Health then wrote a note to 
President Ford. In the note, he shifted Sencer’s conditional to the future tense, 
from possibility into apparent certainty: “There is evidence there will be a major 
epidemic this coming fall. The indication is that we will see a return of 1918 flu 
virus that is the most virulent form of flu. In 1918 a half a million people died. 
The projections are that this virus will kill one million Americans in 1976.”24 
 
Ford consulted a number of leading experts in virology and public health, 
including Jonas Salk, who urged mass vaccination.25 The President publicly 
announced the vaccination plan on March 24th, saying: “No one knows exactly 
how serious this threat could be. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to take a 
chance with the health of the nation.”26 In April the Assistant Secretary testified 
at House and Senate hearings, citing historical data as evidence of the threat, 
but hedging on making a prediction: “By reviewing the epidemiology and 
natural history of this process … there is a good likelihood that there will be 
influenza caused by this particular agent.”27  
 
Outside of the administration and its circle of experts there was some criticism 
of the program. The New Jersey state epidemiologist publicly warned of 
dangerous side effects. New York Times editorials were repeatedly skeptical, 
accusing the administration of engaging in politics at the expense of science in 
an election year. In advance of a major meeting of program participants in 
Atlanta, one cautious expert wrote in to Sencer to recommend stockpiling 
vaccines, “along the lines of military defense,” and developing “well worked-out 
contingency plans.”28 The idea was to create a period of potential intervention 
in anticipation of the event, rather than engaging in immediate intervention. 
Such an approach would have provided an alternative to mass vaccination. The 
proposal was not taken seriously: as I will argue below, this type of 
“preparedness” measure was not, at this stage, part of the conceptual toolkit of 
public health.  
 
The goal of the program was to start immunizations in August and finish before 
the end of winter. Field trials of the vaccine launched in April. By June, the 
epidemic had not yet appeared. At an ACIP meeting in Bethesda that month, 
virologist Alfred Sabin suggested stockpiling the vaccine. Again, Sencer 
                                                
23 Ibid., 30. The memo would prove politically impossible to ignore, given the later possibility of a leak. 
A Ford advisor recalled discussing options at a meeting with the President, and thinking: “That 
memo’s a gun to our head.” 
24 Ibid., 35. 
25 Ibid., 35. Salk saw the program as an “opportunity to fill part of the ‘immunity gap’” – that is, the 
gap between environmental antigens and populations without antibodies. 
26 Ibid., 46. 
27 Ibid., 49-50. 
28 Ibid., 60. 
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countered there was “no rational basis for a general ‘stockpiling’ concept:’” 
because of “jet spread,” the flu would move too fast.29  
 
An unexpected blow to the program came shortly thereafter: vaccine 
manufacturers announced that they would not bottle the vaccine without 
liability insurance. Insurers were unwilling to offer such coverage, given 
uncertainties about the health risks of the vaccination program. “These 
questions defied actuaries. There was no experience… They were in the 
business to spread risk, not take it.”30 For the program to begin, the 
government would have to find a way to assure manufacturers that liability risk 
would be covered.31 Once this problem was solved and the program finally 
began, there were major problems with logistics at the federal level, and wide 
variability in individual states’ capacity to actually implement the program.  
 
What then became clear was that CDC had not seriously considered how to 
manage the risk of side effects. On October 11th, three elderly vaccine 
recipients in Pittsburgh died soon after receiving their shot. CDC’s response did 
not reassure the public. “We expected deaths,” they announced. Among 70-to-
74 year olds, there would be ten to twelve deaths per 100,000 vaccinations. 
Despite these problems, by December 40 million had been immunized, though 
they were oddly distributed given the variation in individual states’ execution of 
the plan. In the middle of the month, however, Minnesota health officials 
reported multiple cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome, a severe neurological 
condition, among vaccinees. At this point it was clear that the expected 
epidemic was not coming, and the program was immediately suspended. The 
Times editorialized: “Swine Flu Fiasco.” 
 
While the program eventually led to a successful policy of routine annual flu 
vaccinations for high-risk groups, it has generally been cast as an abysmal 
failure. A major source of the failure, a report later suggested, was a lack of 
foresight. Health officials did not have contingency plans in place – and so 
reacted in an ad hoc manner. Thus they were not able to make available to 
themselves a solution that could have helped: stockpiling in advance, and then 
– if the epidemic did develop – applying advanced logistics to design a fast 
method of vaccine distribution. Moreover, they did not envision potential 
problems such as manufacturers’ liability and varying individual state 
distribution capacities. Given the rationality of public health prevention, there 
                                                
29 Earlier in the course of planning, Vice President Rockefeller – to little effect – had mentioned a 
possible solution to the problem of jet-spread: he suggested that a Pentagon logistics officer would 
know how to conduct inoculations in two-to-four weeks. 
30 Ibid., 77. 
31 The matter was settled by the outbreak of a fatal illness at the Legionnaires Convention in 
Philadelphia. Although the illness turned out not to be swine flu, alarm around the episode was 
enough to enable the passage of legislation requiring that vaccine liability claims be filed against the 
government rather than manufacturers.  
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was “no choice” but to go forward with mass vaccination. Public health officials 
did not have a mechanism to engage in responsible action under conditions of 
uncertainty. 
 
 
The Vulnerable System 
 
Interestingly, around the same time a systematic method for dealing flexibly 
with potential crises was being developed in a very different domain of 
government. Civil defense had extended its purview from a focus on nuclear 
catastrophe to a more general form of preparedness for emergencies. In this 
section I describe the articulation of “crisis management” as a novel approach 
to uncertain, but potentially catastrophic threats.  
 
An exemplary figure was Robert Kupperman, an applied mathematician who 
worked in Nixon’s Office of Emergency Preparedness in the early 1970s. A 
specialist in operations research, Kupperman had come to the OEP from the 
Institute for Defense Analysis, a civilian think tank that conducted research for 
the Defense Department. His task was to quantitatively analyze the operations 
of large socio-technical systems, such as energy, transportation and industrial 
production. Based in the Systems Evaluation Division of OEP, Kupperman was 
involved in governmental response to a number of crises in the early 1970s, 
including the wage-price freeze, Hurricane Agnes, a rash of terrorist attacks, 
and the energy crisis.  
 
In this context Kupperman developed an interest in the common structure of 
crisis situations, and in the development of techniques that could be used to 
prepare for them in advance. He argued that crises, however diverse, shared a 
certain number of common problems: the paucity of accurate information, the 
difficulty of communication among decision-makers, and a confusing array of 
authorities seeking to take charge of the situation. Such situations involved 
uncertainty about what was unfolding, coupled with an urgent demand for 
immediate action to alleviate the crisis. Flexibility for decision-makers 
depended on the extent to which the crisis manager had forecast the situation 
and invested in preparation for it. The apparent recent increase in numbers of 
crises demonstrated the contemporary importance of such foresight. “As we 
begin to recognize the complex problems that threaten every nation with 
disaster,” he and two colleagues from SED asked, “can we continue to trust the 
ad hoc processes of instant reaction to muddle through?”32  
 
Kupperman’s background was in operations research (OR), a relatively new 
field dating from World War II efforts to introduce quantitative analysis to 
                                                
32 Kupperman, Wilcox and Smith (1975). “Crisis Management: Some Opportunities,” in Science 187, 
229. 
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military practice. OR developed tools for analyzing and optimizing complex 
systems. This meant first of all seeing multiple, heterogeneous elements as part 
of a coherent system whose behavior was, as Jay Forrester put it, “a 
consequence of the interaction of its parts.”33 For example, in studying the 
efficiency of allied bombing strategy during World War II, OR analysts gathered 
detailed data on specific bombing runs, looking at the interconnection and 
interaction of multiple variables such as altitude, speed, number and formation 
of bombers, weather and light. “In general,” as historian Thomas Hughes 
writes, “advocates of the systems approach perceived, conceived of, or 
created a world made up of systems.”34 The systems view gained prominence 
in the 1960s in think tanks like the RAND Corporation and in government 
agencies such as the Defense Department under Robert McNamara.  
 
If early operations researchers were interested in the optimization of systems, 
Kupperman was most concerned with their potential failure. His experience in 
the Office of Emergency Preparedness led him toward an emphasis on the 
vulnerability of critical systems to sudden, unexpected events. After leaving the 
OEP, he continued to think about how to systematize governmental response 
to crisis, especially through his work at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. He was co-author, with R. James Woolsey, of a 1984 
CSIS Report on “crisis management in a society of networks” called America’s 
Hidden Vulnerabilities. The report argued that the U.S. relied for its well-being 
on a sophisticated and intricate set of systems, or networks, for energy 
distribution, communication, and transportation. It noted recent disruptions of 
these systems, and warned: “A serious potential exists … for much more 
serious disabling of networks crucial to life support, economic stability, and 
national defense.”35 
 
At CSIS, Kupperman and his colleagues sought to persuade national security 
officials of the problem of system-vulnerability, and the need to develop 
techniques of contingency planning. One of their approaches was to hold 
scenario-based simulations of crisis situations, and invite officials to 
participate.36 The emergency exercise was a tool for demonstrating to leaders 
the vulnerabilities of vital systems. As he and Woolsey wrote:  
 
If planning has involved the operating teams and managers (as it 
always should) these critical personnel gain an increased 
                                                
33 Jay Forrester, cit. in Thomas Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 141. 
34 Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 142 (check). 
35 Woolsey and Kupperman, America’s Hidden Vulnerabilities: Crisis Management in a Society of 
Networks (1985), 2. For the history of systems-vulnerability thinking, see Stephen J. Collier and 
Andrew Lakoff, “How ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Became a Security Problem,” in Myriam Dunn, ed., The 
Changing Logics of Risk and Security (Routledge, forthcoming). 
36 See, for example, Andrew C. Goldberg, et al, Leaders and Crisis: the CSIS Crisis Simulations. CSIS 
Significant Issues Series, 1987. 
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understanding of how the system works and, particularly valuable, 
how it is likely to behave under abnormal conditions. Training with 
crisis games and emergency exercises will augment this benefit 
significantly.37 
  
America’s Hidden Vulnerabilities listed a number of measures to ensure the 
continued functioning of vital systems in the event of emergency, including: 
improving system resilience, building in redundancy, stockpiling spare parts, 
performing risk analysis as a means of prioritizing resource allocation, and 
running scenario-based exercises. A final key element of crisis management, 
according to the Report, was the specification in advance of responsibilities 
during the crisis situation itself.38  
 
There is, of course, a long history of reflection on how to approach specific 
crisis situations – extending from early quarantine plans to Cold War civil 
defense. And the military practice of training simulations or “war games” of 
course also has a long history. What was perhaps distinctive about 
Kupperman’s approach was the application of the method of imaginative 
enactment to the generic crisis situation in order to generate knowledge about 
internal system-vulnerabilities. As we will see, the CSIS method of crisis 
simulation would eventually help convince national security planners to think 
seriously about biological threats.  
 
 
Regulating Viral Traffic 
 
But first: how were the two strands we have been looking at – public health on 
the one hand, and contingency planning on the other – brought together? The 
first conjuncture I want to follow is an encounter between military medicine and 
international health. At a conference of tropical disease specialists in Honolulu 
in 1989, Col. Llewellyn Legters ran a table-top exercise simulating the outbreak 
of a deadly and highly contagious virus. Legters, then head of preventive 
medicine at the Uniformed Services Hospital, had been a Special Forces doctor 
in Vietnam, where he had treated the first reported case of drug-resistant 
malaria in 1964.39 His exercise in Honolulu focused on the lack of international 
public health resources to manage a dangerous outbreak. Its premise was that 
a pandemic of a novel and horrifying virus – an “airborne Ebola” – had broken 
out among refugees in war-torn African republic. As the epidemic extended to 
                                                
37 AHV, 16 (check). 
38 “Cooperative action during a crisis requires coordinated preparation beforehand with 
responsibilities clear for resolving differences concerning both the measures to be taken and the 
accounts to be charged.” AHV, 17. 
39 Two years later he founded the Field Epidemiological Survey Team to track this strain of malaria in 
the midst of the war. See Norma Mohr, Malaria: Evolution of a Killer (2001). 
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humanitarian aid workers, initial public health response was tepid, and the 
disease spread rapidly to the United States.  
 
Participants in the exercise saw that there was no system in place to contain 
such an outbreak if it occurred. Journalist Laurie Garrett wrote in Newsday: “As 
the hours wore on, most of the scientists gathered in the auditorium seemed to 
forget that they were playing at war games to see how the United States would 
respond to the outbreak of a lethal disease. Even though the situation was 
made up for a fictional place, the response was based on the real world of 
today’s medical resources and politics.”40 After the exercise, Legters 
announced that “the outbreak has confirmed, in a very dramatic way, just how 
ill-prepared we are to detect global epidemic disease threats in a timely 
fashion, and, once detected, to respond appropriately.”41  
 
Experts in the field were alarmed. As Garrett reported:  
 
I found this scenario very realistic,” said Dr. William Reeves, 
professor emeritus from the University of California at Berkeley and 
one of the world’s experts on disease-carrying insect control. “You 
could take any disease as a model - Ebola, malaria, whatever - and 
it would reveal the same thing. We aren’t ready. Where are the 
people? The expertise? The equipment? Some planning needs to 
be done on this. 
 
Legters’ exercise was exemplary of the problematic of “emerging infectious 
disease” as it was articulated the late 1980s and early 1990s.42 Also in 1989, 
virologist Stephen Morse and Nobel Prize winner Joshua Lederberg hosted a 
major conference on the topic, which led to the landmark volume, Emerging 
Viruses.43 Participants in the conference warned of a dangerous intersection: 
On the one hand, there were a number of new disease threats, including 
emerging viruses such as AIDS and Ebola as well as newly anti-microbial 
resistant strains of diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. On the other 
hand, the global public health infrastructure had been left to decay, beginning in 
the late 1960s with the assumption that infectious disease had been 
conquered. Moreover, the emergence of dangerous new infectious diseases 
                                                
40 Laurie Garrett, “A Medical War Game,” Newsday, Jan 23, 1990.  
41 Llewellyn Letgers, et al (1993), “Are We Prepared for a Viral Epidemic Emergency?” in Stephen S. 
Morse, ed, Emerging Viruses. 
42 As Nicholas King has shown, this vision quickly found prominent adherents in medicine, the life 
sciences and journalism. Nicholas B. King, “Security, Disease, Commerce: Post-colonial Ideologies of 
Global Health, in Social Studies of Science 32 (2002). One important report was: Institute of Medicine, 
Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States (1992). Garrett’s The Coming 
Plague and Preston’s The Hot Zone both appeared in 1994. Also see Lyle Fearnley, “’From Chaos to 
Controlled Disorder:’ Syndromic Surveillance, Bioweapons, and the Pathological Future,” ARC 
Working Paper (2005). 
43 Stephen S. Morse, ed., Emerging Viruses (Oxford, 1993). 
 
 
Lakoff / From Population to Vital System 
 14 
could be expected to continue, due to a number of global processes, such as 
increased travel, urbanization, civil wars and refugee crises, and environmental 
destruction. 
 
In his chapter of Emerging Viruses, Legters argued for a rejuvenation of the field 
of tropical medicine as the generation trained in World War II retired. He 
pointed to declining US capability in epidemiology, diagnosis and treatment of 
tropical disease. The chapter identified both the sources of the new disease 
threat, along the lines of Morse, and institutional responses that would be 
necessary to manage it: a global surveillance system to identify the outbreak; a 
laboratory system to characterize the agent; a reporting system to alert world 
health community; and academic training of a new generation of tropical 
disease experts. 
 
Legters’ exercise framed the closing chapter of Garrett’s best-selling book, The 
Coming Plague (1994). “What the war games revealed,” she wrote, “was an 
appalling state of nonreadiness. Overall, the mood in Honolulu after five hours 
was grim, even nervous. The failings, weaknesses, and gaps in preparedness 
were enormous.”44 But her vision of the source of the problem was broader 
than that of scientists such as Legters or Henderson. On the one hand, she 
diagnosed a collapse of the global public health system. Problems included 
discrepancies in capabilities between different health departments, widespread 
deficiencies in disease reporting systems, little staff for disease surveillance, 
and suffering health department laboratories. The international situation was 
even worse. 
 
At the same time, Garrett argued that global living conditions – poverty, civil 
war, lack of basic health care – were the source of the emerging disease threat, 
and that these social problems would need to be addressed in order to provide 
security against emerging pathogens. She quoted former CDC director William 
Foege, who argued that new disease emergence was linked to 
“thirdworldization”: the overall status of health care, immunizations, sanitation, 
education. According to Foege, structural adjustments had worsened the 
human condition and improved odds for microbes. “It is impossible to ensure a 
disease-free existence for people in North American and Western Europe 
without providing similar assurances for residents of Azerbaijan, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Bangladesh,” he said.45  
 
But this “population security” orientation to the threat of emerging disease was 
mostly overshadowed by a more technical focus on strengthening the public 
                                                
44 Garrett, “Searching for Solutions: Preparedness, Surveillance, and the New Understanding,” The 
Coming Plague, 594. 
45 The Coming Plague, 609. Similarly, former CDC epidemiologist Joseph McCormick argued that “the 
links between poverty, lack of basic health care, ecological disturbances, and the emergence of 
dangerous microbes were so obvious as to be basic tenets of public health.” 
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health system against new pathogens – for example in proposals by 
epidemiologist DA Henderson for a global disease surveillance system to be 
managed by the CDC. Henderson was well-known for his leadership of the 
1970s smallpox eradication program, which combined techniques of 
surveillance and containment. He argued for the inevitability of novel pathogen 
emergence: “mutation and change are facts of nature, that the world is 
increasingly interdependent, and that human health and survival will be 
challenged, ad infinitum, by new and mutant microbes, with unpredictable 
pathophysiological manifestations.”46 As a result, he said, “we are uncertain as 
to what we should keep under surveillance, or even what we should look for.”  
 
As Lyle Fearnley (2005) has shown, Henderson sought to link this new problem 
to a solution that had been proposed several decades earlier by his mentor, 
Alexander Langmuir, in the context of the Cold War threat of a bioweapons 
attack: an integrated global system of disease surveillance.47 What we need, 
Henderson argued, is a system that can detect novelty: in the case of AIDS, 
such a detection system could have warned early of new virus and put 
measures in place to prevent its spread. A good disease surveillance system 
would have three elements: first, units to detect unusual cases; second, a 
channel to report the occurrence; and third, a capacity to respond to unusual 
events. He proposed a system of global surveillance units to be run by CDC, 
and located in peri-urban areas in major cities in the tropics, which could 
provide a “window on events in surrounding areas.”  
 
 
Disease as a National Security Threat 
 
At this stage, “emerging infectious disease” – though widely taken up as a 
public health and biomedical problem – was not yet conceptualized as an issue 
of national security. This changed a decade later when the emerging infectious 
disease problematic combined with increased anxiety about bioterrorism. 
Scenario-based exercises were central to this process. 
 
In the 1990s, accounts began to circulate of a massive, secret Soviet bio-
weapons program that had continued throughout the Cold War, and which had 
employed scores of scientists whose whereabouts were now unknown.48 D. A. 
Henderson was perhaps the first to link the new bioterrorist threat to the 
                                                
46 DA Henderson, “Surveillance Systems,” in Morse, ed., Emerging Viruses, 283. See Fearnley (2005) 
for a detailed analysis.  
47 As Fearnley notes, Langmuir provided the modern definition of disease surveillance: “continued 
watchfulness over the distribution and trends of incidence through systematic collection, 
consolidation and evaluation of morbidity and mortality data and other relevant data.” See Alexander 
Langmuir, “The Surveillance of Communicable Diseases of National Importance,” N Engl J Med vol. 
268, no. 4, (24 Jan 1963, 182-3). 
48 The program was described by one of its leaders, Ken Alibek, in his 1999 book, Biohazard. 
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problem of emerging diseases.49 He argued that his proposed global disease 
surveillance system would be useful for both types of threat – from emerging 
diseases and from proliferating bio-weapons knowledge. In 1998, Henderson 
founded the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense, which became a 
leading site of knowledge production around the new biosecurity threat.  
 
Dark Winter 
 
The CDC developed a number of initiatives in response to the bioterrorist threat 
– one of which was a program of global disease surveillance modeled on 
Henderson’s proposal. Another was the Office of Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response, which provided $40 million per year in bioterrorism grants to 
local public health departments. However, critics such as Tara O’Toole of the 
Hopkins Biodefense Center argued that these measures were not nearly 
enough.50 The question was: how to convince officials of the need to address 
the problem? This threat was different from what public health experts were 
accustomed to dealing with: there was no historical record on which to 
estimate its likelihood of occurrence, or to calculate the most effective 
intervention measures. Nor was biosecurity a problem that national security 
experts were trained to think about. What kind of experience could convey a 
sense of urgency and generate knowledge about necessary interventions?  
 
With O’Toole’s lead, the Hopkins Biosecurity Center entered into a 
collaboration with Kupperman’s former think tank, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, to design a table-top exercise simulating a smallpox 
attack on the United States.51 The exercise, called “Dark Winter,” took place at 
Andrews Air Force Base in June 2001. It was aimed at influential national 
security experts and government officials. Participants included Sam Nunn as 
the President, David Gergen as National Security Advisor, and James Woolsey 
as Director of the CIA. The exercise took place in three segments over two 
days, depicting a time span of two weeks after the initial attack. While 
designers used historical data on the patterns of smallpox outbreaks to design 
the scenario, the point of using this epidemiological data was not to accurately 
model probability, but rather to create a plausible story.52  
                                                
49 Fearnley (2005). 
50 Tara O’Toole. Testimony to House to Committee on Government Affairs, Hearing on FEMA’s Role in 
Managing Bioterrorist Attacks and the Impact of Public Health Concerns on Bioterrorism 
Preparedness. July 23, 2001. 
51 A third organization, the ANSER Institute – run by a formal Air Force Colonel and specializing in 
scenario development – lent its technical expertise. 
52 A critical question, for example, was the transmission rate assumed. The smallpox transmission rate 
fluctuates widely based on multiple contextual factors. To determine the rate for the exercise, the 
developers analyzed 34 European cases of smallpox between 1958 and 1973 – and chose the 
example of an outbreak in Yugoslavia example as their model. Tara O’Toole, Michael Mair, and 
Thomas V. Inglesby, “Shining Light on ‘Dark Winter’”, Clinical Infectious Diseases 2002; 34: 972-83. 
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The first NSC meeting laid out the situation for Council members. There were 
reports of an outbreak of smallpox in Oklahoma City, assumed to be the result 
of a terrorist attack. Initial questions for the Council were technical: “With only 
12 million doses of vaccine available, what is the best strategy to contain the 
outbreak? Should there be a national or a state vaccination policy? Is ring 
vaccination or mass immunization the best policy?” The problem was that there 
was not enough information about the scale of the attack to come up with a 
solution. By the second meeting, the situation looked grim. “Only 1.25 million 
doses of vaccine remain, and public unrest grows as the vaccine supply 
dwindles,” read the scenario. “Vaccine distribution efforts vary from state to 
state, are often chaotic, and lead to violence in some areas.” International 
borders were closed, leading to food shortages. Meanwhile simulated 24-hour 
news coverage, shown to participants as video clips, sharply criticized the 
government’s response. Graphic photographs of American smallpox victims 
were also shown. 
 
As vaccine stock dwindled further, the prospect of using the National Guard to 
enforce containment was broached. But who had the authority to make 
emergency decisions? In one sequence, an NSC member advised the President 
to federalize the National Guard, as states had begun to seal their borders. 
Gov. Keating objected: 
 
Keating: “That’s not your function.” 
Terwillinger: “Mr. President, this question got settled at 
Appomattox. You need to federalize the National Guard.” 
Nunn: “We’re going to have absolute chaos if we start having war 
between the federal government and the state government.” 
 
Meanwhile civil unrest grew. “With vaccine in short supply, increasingly anxious 
crowds mob vaccination clinics,” the scenario continued. “Riots around a 
vaccination site in Philadelphia left two dead. At another vaccination site, angry 
citizens overwhelmed vaccinators.”53 By the third meeting, there had been 
thousands of deaths, and the situation was growing still worse. The exercise 
ended as the disaster continued to escalate: there was no vaccine remaining 
and none was expected for four weeks. CSIS Director John Hamre later 
narrated the final stage: “In the last 48 hours there were 14,000 cases. We now 
have over 1,000 dead, another 5,000 that we expected to be dead within 
weeks. There are 200 people who died from the vaccination, because there is a 
                                                                                                                                     
For a critique, see Ronald Barrett, “Dark Winter and the Spring of 1972: Deflecting the Social Lessons 
of Smallpox.” Medical Anthropology, Vol. 25, No. 2. (June 2006), pp. 171-191. 
53 Final Script, Dark Winter Exercise, 24. 
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small percentage [of risk], and we have administered 12 million doses… At this 
stage the medical system is overwhelmed completely.”54 
 
Political influence worked through a process of dissemination. At Congressional 
hearings on the exercise, participants reported on their experience of Dark 
Winter. For example, Sam Nunn reflected on the debate over using the National 
Guard: “It is a terrible dilemma. Because you know that your vaccine is going to 
give out, and you know the only other strategy is isolation, but you don’t know 
who to isolate. That is the horror of this situation.” As Hamre said, “We thought 
that we were going to be spending our time with the mechanisms of 
government. We ended up spending our time saying, how do we save 
democracy in America? Because it is that serious, and it is that big.” 
 
The point of the exercise was to give national security officials a feeling of how 
an unprecedented event might unfold. Its circle of influence extended outward 
through a series of briefings featuring a realistic video portraying the events as 
they unfolded. Vice President Cheney, DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, and key 
Congressional leaders were among those briefed. At a Congressional hearing 
where the video was about to be shown, Rep. Christopher Shays asked Hamre 
about its affective qualities: 
 
Mr. Shays. Now, I understand there may be some graphic display 
here. 
Mr. Hamre. Sir, there will be graphics as well as some video. This 
will be shown on these side monitors.  
Mr. Shays. I’m told that some of it is not pleasant. 
Mr. Hamre. It is not pleasant. Let me also emphasize, sir, this is a 
simulation. This had frightening qualities of being real, as a matter 
of fact too real. And because we have television cameras here 
broadcasting, we want to tell everyone, this did not happen, it was 
a simulation. But, it had such realism, and we are going to try to 
show you the sense of realism that came from that today.55 
 
Indeed, Shays did react strongly to the video, noting afterwards how nervous 
he had felt while watching it: 
 
I felt like I’ve been in the middle of a movie, and maybe that’s 
why I was anxious. I wanted to know how it turned out. And so I 
asked my staff how did we finally get a handle on it, you know, 
12 million vaccines out, the disease spreading? And the response 
                                                
54 “Combating Terrorism: Federal Response to a Biological Weapons Attack. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on 
Government Reform. House of Representatives, July 23, 2001. 
55 “Combating Terrorism” hearing, July 23, 2001. 
 
 
Lakoff / From Population to Vital System 
 19 
was we did not get a handle on it. They stopped the exercise 
before resolution. Kind of scary, huh? 
 
The exercise was successful in that it convinced participants – and later briefing 
audiences – of the urgent need to plan for a bio-attack. Keating was stunned at 
the lack of preparedness demonstrated by the exercise: “We think an enemy of 
the United States could attack us with smallpox or with anthrax…and we really 
don’t prepare for it, we have no vaccines for it – that’s astonishing.” As 
Woolsey noted, this was a new type of enemy: “we are used to thinking about 
health problems as naturally occurring problems outside the framework of a 
malicious actor.” With disease as tool of attack, “we are in a world we haven’t 
ever really been in before.” 
 
The exercise demonstrated a number of vulnerabilities. First, officials did not 
have real-time understanding – “situational awareness” - of the various aspects 
of the crisis while it unfolded. As the scenario designers wrote, “this lack of 
information, critical for leaders’ situational awareness in Dark Winter, reflects 
the fact that few systems exist that can provide a rapid flow of the medical and 
public health information needed in a public health emergency.”56 Second, 
without adequate stockpiles of medical counter-measures, leaders could not 
properly manage the crisis. Third, there was a gulf between public health and 
national security expertise: “It isn’t just [a matter of] buying more vaccine,” said 
Woolsey. “It’s a question of how we integrate these public health and national 
security communities in ways that allow us to deal with various facets of the 
problem.” 
 
Participants had concrete suggestions for improvement. Nunn argued for 
vaccination of first responders in advance of an attack: “every one of those 
people you are trying to mobilize is going to have to be vaccinated. You can’t 
expect them to go in there and expose themselves and their family to smallpox 
or any other deadly disease without vaccinations.” Hauer, a former New York 
City emergency manager, spoke of the problem of distributing vaccines in 
cities: “The logistical infrastructure necessary to vaccinate the people of New 
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago is just—would be mind-boggling.” But the 
broader lesson was the need to enact the event in order to plan for it. As Hamre 
said, “We didn’t have the strategy at the table on how to deal with this, because 
we have never thought our way through it before, and systematically thinking 
our way through this kind of a crisis is now going to become a key imperative. It 
clearly is going to require many more exercises.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                
56 O’Toole, et al (2002), 980. 
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Smallpox Vaccination 
 
In looking the deliberations of the CDC’s panel of external public health experts, 
the ACIP, over this period, one can see how the new imperative for bioterrorism 
preparedness conflicted with the existing rationality of public health. Dale Rose 
has described this history in detail.57 In June 2001, ACIP addressed the 
question of whether a smallpox vaccination campaign should be implemented. 
While the Committee laid out a “post-event” plan for containment of the virus in 
the case of an attack, it did not recommend widespread pre-event vaccination. 
Indeed, it argued: “The risk of smallpox occurring as a result of a deliberate 
release by terrorists is considered low, and the population at risk for such an 
exposure cannot be determined.”58 ACIP was here faced with an uncertain 
threat: an event that was conceivable, but which had never occurred, and 
whose consequences could be catastrophic. Without data on probability, the 
Committee did not have the means to rationally assess risk. 
 
The events that Fall – the attacks of 9/11 followed by the anthrax letters –
intensified the sense of urgency to engage in bioterrorism preparedness. The 
focus was on specific threats, especially those judged most likely to be used by 
terrorists, such as anthrax and smallpox. In addition to stockpiling drugs and 
vaccines, the administration urged the CDC to develop a plan for smallpox 
vaccination. Apparently the Dark Winter scenario played a role in this decision. 
In turn, CDC asked ACIP to take the issue up again. Committee members 
agreed that the traditional model of post-event containment rather than pre-
event mass vaccination remained the best overall strategy.  
 
But there remained the question of whether some members of the population – 
such as healthcare workers – should nonetheless be vaccinated prior to any 
incidence of the disease. The problem with pre-event vaccination of hundreds 
of thousands of first responders was that there were known risks from the 
vaccine itself: if such a program were performed, there would be serious 
adverse events, including fatalites – in the absence of any incidence of the 
disease. The transcript of the June 2002 ACIP meeting indicates that the 
experts were not thinking in terms of plausible scenarios – rather, they needed 
numbers that could be taken up as part of a statistical risk assessment:  
 
To make … decisions, the A.C.I.P. needs data. Those on vaccine 
efficacy and safety are in hand, but not for the risk of the disease. 
Does anyone have more information that they can share? Without 
it, should the A.C.I.P. even make this decision…?”  
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One could calculate the risks of the taking the vaccine, but not the risks of not 
taking the vaccine – ie. the risk of an attack. The Committee requested more 
information, but CDC responded: “Some information [on the threat]… could be 
provided, but the bottom line would be the same as the message being 
received here today. The C.D.C. Director would not place on this Committee 
the burden of making a risk assessment. The members were informed as best 
as possible under the circumstances that the risk is not zero but is perceived to 
be low.” A smallpox attack was an uncertain probability, high consequence 
event – one not amenable to treatment with probabilistic calculation. Arguably, 
the problem of the credibility of knowledge-claims based on scenario planning 
for public health workers was one factor in the eventual failure of the Smallpox 
Vaccination Program, which was suspended after reaching less than 10% of its 
original goal of vaccinating 500,000 healthcare providers. Thus it was still the 
case – as we saw in the Swine flu episode – that worst-case preparedness was 
not an intuitive rationale for public health experts. One lesson of the failed 
smallpox vaccination program, for biosecurity planners, was that simulation 
exercises would have to be applied more broadly to local public health workers.  
 
 
The Scenario-Event: Hurricane Katrina and Avian Flu 
 
Until 2005, such preparedness efforts were mostly focused on specific threat 
agents such as smallpox and anthrax. These efforts were reoriented by the 
failed governmental response to Hurricane Katrina. For thinkers of 
preparedness, Katrina served as a “live action” exercise demonstrating gaps in 
the system of preparedness. The disaster also suggested that while homeland 
security planners had been focused on the threat of terrorism, the problematic 
of emergency was much broader: the rubric of “all-hazards planning” that had 
originally structured FEMA came to the fore.59  
 
The problem of avian flu now appeared in a new light – in terms of the 
vulnerability of the nation’s public health infrastructure. Washington, DC was in 
a “post-Katrina, pre-pandemic” moment, as one commentator put it.60 As a 
member of the House Homeland Security Committee said, “the pandemic flu 
scenario is affording us much more time to prepare, but as of today it appears 
that the nation is poised to repeat a grave error by not heeding the lessons 
learned from Katrina.”61 For Sen. Richard Burr, chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Public Health Preparedness, Katrina “exposed an unstable public health 
infrastructure at all levels of government during an emergency event.”62 Burr 
argued that the task at hand was akin to Eisenhower’s in constructing the 
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nation’s highway infrastructure: “For the purpose of a national public health and 
defense we need a national standardized public health system.” It would have 
to do more than prepare for known threats: “The question is, are we smart 
enough to design a template that enables us to address the threats that we 
don’t know about for tomorrow”?  
 
What were the necessary elements of such a system? These could be seen 
through an analysis of current gaps in response. Experts and officials 
collaborated to constitute the elements of a public health system, based on 
knowledge of its vulnerabilities. “There are multiple holes in our capacity to 
respond,” said Henry Waxman. “We need to increase our vaccine production 
capacity, strengthen our public health infrastructure, create adequate hospital 
surge capacity and draft contingency plans that will ensure the continued 
operation of important government functions.”63  
 
For many officials, the most serious problem Katrina had exposed was that of 
the locus of responsibility in an emergency situation. For some, the problem 
was the incompetence of federal leadership. For others, it was that local 
authorities were not up to the task of coordinating response. Former Homeland 
Security Advisor Richard Falkenrath argued that state and local health 
authorities would be incapable of coordinating an adequate response to a 
catastrophic disease event. The Health Department, he testified, “is simply not 
going to be able to meet the American people’s expectation of the federal 
government in a truly catastrophic disease contingency such as a high lethal 
pandemic or major bioterrorist attack.” He was especially concerned about civil 
unrest resulting from “shortages in vital, life-saving counter-measures to the 
disease in question” – the premise of Dark Winter. “I mean something very, very 
specific, which is to prepare to distribute life-saving medications to extremely 
large populations, very, very quickly, when they are afraid, because there is a 
communicable disease out there that they do not know how to deal with.”  
 
Falkenrath cited evidence from scenario-based exercises to validate his claim 
that HHS did not have the operational capabilities to distribute medical supplies 
in a crisis: “This extraordinary national deficiency was first revealed during the 
first TOPOFF exercise in May 2000 at which I was an observer,” and “in a wide 
variety of smaller scale table top exercises and simulations.” He continued: 
“The implication is inescapable: the plans, if put to the severe test of a 
catastrophic disease scenario in the near future, will fail.” There was a clear 
policy implication: the National Response Plan should be amended to assign 
Emergency Support Function #8 to the military in a catastrophic disease 
incident, at the order of the president: “Only the Department of Defense has the 
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planning, logistics, and personnel resources needed to conduct nationwide 
medical relief operations in a full-scale catastrophic disease scenario.”64 
 
O’Toole drew a different lesson from Katrina: “What we have to do, and what 
the main point of planning is, as we have learned in all of the emergency 
preparedness done so far, is that we have to start talking with each other.”65 
She disagreed with Falkenrath. “I think it would be a big mistake to… plan to 
put DOD in charge whenever we have a big bad thing happening.” While it is 
necessary to “rethink federalism,” she argued, the federal role is one of creating 
infrastructure to enable local response: “What the feds have to do is create the 
capacity to plug in and that’s where they ought to be focusing on. But I don’t 
think we want the DOD to suddenly become everybody’s responder in cases of 
dire need.”66 
 
Another suggestion was that local health agencies should do more exercises. A 
representative of the American College of Emergency Physicians said: “We 
need to train the hospital and health care workers to more long-term pandemic 
scenarios. And then we need to take these lessons learned, the best practices 
and lessons learned, and disseminate.”67 The Commissioner of Health of 
Duchess County New York testified: “I think over the last five years we’ve built 
the framework of a system that we can carry forward . . . but we need to 
strengthen that and continue to have strategic exercises community wide, not 
just public health departments, but every single community drill to include as 
many partners as possible so that we can learn from each other.”68 And a 
Virginia state emergency health preparedness official said: “we have been 
working very closely with DHS in terms of developing metrics as well as with 
the CDC and DHHS, but we need to assure that we have the exercises and 
events to test our plans and that’s really the test of preparedness. What we’ve 
done in Virginia is we’ve used every event as an opportunity to test our plans 
and we’ve had many.”69 
 
By the end of the year, Congress had moved to address the problem of 
preparedness in a more sustained, integrated way, with the passage of the 
“The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006.” Even critics of the 
prior year’s plan hailed the bill’s passage as a “milestone” piece of public health 
                                                
64 Falkenrath, testimony to Senate Committee on Health Education and Labor, March 16, 2006.  
65 Joint hearing on avian flu, House Homeland Security Committee: Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack Subcommittee with Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology 
Subcommittee, February 8, 2006. 
66 Hearing of the Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness Subcommittee, Senate Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, March 28, 2006. 
67 House Homeland Security Committee, Feburary 8, 2006. 
68 March 28, 2006 
69 March 28, 2006. 
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legislation.70 The Act included a range of measures, from the reorganization of 
Federal health administration, to funding for local and state health agencies, the 
training of epidemiological investigators, and a novel biomedical research 
initiative. A key issue the Act sought to address was how to create an 
integrated “system” of public health preparedness, one that extended from 
disease detection to vaccine production to the relations among the various 
government agencies that would be charged with response. This system was 
focused not specifically on pandemic flu, but on a generic form of threat: an 
unpredictable, but potentially catastrophic disease event.  
 
There was broad agreement that addressing this threat was not simply a matter 
of public health, but one of national security. While the link between national 
security and public health was not in itself new, what was distinctive about 
these measures was the attempt to integrate the institutions, forms of 
knowledge, and techniques of intervention developed in the period of modern 
public health into a more general system of preparedness, in the context of a 
broader security problematic that focused on the vulnerability of “critical 
infrastructures” to potentially catastrophic events.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In closing, let me return to the comparison, outlined above, between the 1976 
Swine Flu campaign and the “pandemic preparedness” measures enacted 
three decades later. Along with the contrast in their scale, the two techno-
political responses differed profoundly in their approach to disease threat (see 
Table 2). First, the way of conceptualizing the threat to be managed was 
distinct: the 2005-06 measures were focused not only on the specific threat of a 
new and virulent strain of influenza, but at the generic “catastrophic disease 
threat.” Second, the site of intervention differed: whereas the 1976 campaign 
was aimed at the national population using classical methods of public health, 
the later plans were aimed at multiple elements of the “public health 
infrastructure,” both within the United States and globally, including disease 
surveillance capacity, the ability to produce and distribute counter-measures, 
and the administrative organization of response. And third, the prominent form 
of knowledge used to authorize expert claims about needed interventions had 
changed: rather than the statistical calculation of risk based on the historical 
incidence of disease, the emphasis of experts was on knowledge gathered 
through the imaginative enactment of singular events. 
 
 
 
                                                
70 Michael Mair, Beth Maldin and Brad Smith, “Passage of S. 3678: The Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act,” UPMC, Center for Biosecurity, December 20, 2006. 
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Table 2 
Swine Flu vs. Pandemic Preparedness 
 
 Swine Flu (1976) Pandemic Preparedness 
(2006) 
 
Type of threat 
 
Specific Generic 
Normative rationality 
 
Prevention Preparedness 
Target 
 
National population Public health 
infrastructure 
Form of knowledge 
 
Risk calculation Imaginative enactment 
Technique of intervention 
 
Mass vaccination Capacity building 
 
It is not that the two forms of security are necessarily in conflict or mutually 
exclusive: rather, vital systems security operates in reflexive relation to 
population security, working to define its elements as a “critical infrastructure” 
whose vulnerabilities must be mitigated. However, if political attention focuses 
on vital systems security and not on population security, only certain types of 
problems become visible as possible targets of intervention. Whereas Laurie 
Garrett had pointed to global living conditions – poverty, access to health care, 
decent housing – as a key source of the threat of emerging infectious disease, 
the eventual preparedness measures enacted in response to avian flu focused 
only on technical response to the potential outbreak.  
